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This paper sets forth another contribution to the long standing debate 
over  cost  of  capital,  firstly  by  introducing  a  multiplicative  model  that 
translates  the  inner  structure  of  the  weighted  average  cost  of  capital 
rate  and,  secondly,  adjusting  such  rate  for  governance  risk.  The 
conventional wisdom states that the cost of capital may be figured out 
by means of a weighted average of debt and capital. But this is a linear 
approximation only, which may bring about miscalculations, whereas the 
multiplicative model not only takes account of that linear approximation 
but also the joint outcome of expected costs of debt and stock, and their 
proportions in the capital structure. And finally, we factor into the cost of 
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   3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Regarding its meaning, cost of capital has three prevailing alternatives 
of  usage.  Although  its  importance  and  relevance  seems  widely 
established,  the  concept  itself  and  how  to  work  it  out  have  faced  a 
widespread  concern  from  critics.  Let  us  handle  usage  and  criticisms 
separately. 
 
a) As a criterion for financial decisions. 
 




[…]  is  the  cost  of  the  different  components  of  financing  used  by  the  firm, 
weighted  by  their  market  value  proportion.  […]    Since  a  firm  can  raise  its 
money from three sources – equity, debt, and preferred stock – the cost of 
capital is defined by the weighted average of each of these costs. 
  
b) As standard for investment decisions that furnishes a minimal 
rate of return on proposed new investments. 
 
This  was  the  approach  taken  by  Ezra  Solomon  (1955)  in  his  seminal 
paper which attempted to measure any company’s cost of capital: 
 
Its  function  is  to  provide  a  correct  and  objective  criterion  by  which 
management can determine whether it should or should not accept available 
proposals  involving  the  expenditure  of  capital.  Because of  this  function,  this 
concept has also been called the “minimun required rate of earnings” or the 
“cut-off” rate for capital expenditure.  
 
To  put  it  in  other  words,  if  this  required  rate  for  a  new  investment 
project  is  higher  than  the  cost  of  capital,  firm  value  will  increase; 
otherwise, it will lose value
2. 
 
On this line of analysis, Ross et al. (1995) argued that being the cost of 
capital  the  minimum  required  return  on  a  new  investment,  it  can  be 
translated  like  “the  opportunity  cost  associated  with  the  firm’s  capital 
investment.” 
 
Therefore, cost of capital becomes a “hurdle rate” in the following sense: 
                                                 
1 Damodaran (2002), see the References section for further details. 
2  There  are  particular  settings  for  which  this  statement  becomes  fuzzy  and  requires  further 
qualifications.  Apreda  (2009,  forthcoming)  will  deal  with  this  issue  in  the  context  of  investment 
decisions.   4 
i)  for an investment project in the firm’s line of business such a rate 
would grant that the basic business risk of the new asset will be 
the same as the one of already existing assets; 
 
ii)  valuation of an investment project from a different risk class would 
demand  a  cost  of  capital  metrics  that  takes  into  account  the 
proper line of business. 
 
c) As  a  link  between  investment  decisions  and  financing 
decisions. 
 
This was the viewpoint firstly brought to light by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958),  grounded  on  portfolio  theory,  complete  markets,  and  perfect 
arbitrage.  Albeit  constrained  by  utterly  restrictive  assumptions,  it  has 
provided academics and practitioners with plenty of potential for further 
research so far
3.   
 
On these grounds  and focusing on a  portfolio management approach, 
Myers  (1995)  stated  that  the  cost  of  capital  is  the  opportunity  cost 
“borne  by  investors  who  can  put  their  money  into  securities  with  the 
same risk as the proposed project”. 
 
d) Criticism against the current cost of capital usage 
 
However, these contributions have come under an impressive array of 
disapproval nurtured by scholars and  practitioners for whom both the 
concept  of  cost  of  capital  and  the  weighted  average  method  of 
calculation  employed  so  far,  suffer  from  variegated  shortcomings.  For 
instance, Haley and Schall (1976) pointed out that: 
 
As our understanding of more realistic and complex situations increases, the 
concept  of  cost  of  capital  becomes  either  irrelevant,  misleading  or  both  […] 
However, even in textbooks to the extent that it is used as a decision criterion 
it should be confined to the investment decision. The cost of capital concept 
offers no advantage in research and, in the long run, the term cost of capital 
might best be abandoned. 
 
Another  critical  remark  was  raised  by  Reilly  and  Wecker  (1973)  who 
highlighted  that  within  the  weighted  average  cost  of  capital  (WACC) 
paradigm  
 
[there  is]  a  mathematical  error  of  using  weight  average  cost  of  capital  to 
represent the true cost of capital. […] It is not possible to express such cost of 
                                                 
3 On this account, see section 1.1.   5 
capital  as  an  algebraic  combination  of  the  coefficients  of  the  financing 
polynomials  for  the specific  sources of  capital.  Use  of  the  weighted  average 
cost of capital may lead to the establishment of an erroneous investment cut-
off point and/or a nonoptimal capital structure.  
 
A truly debatable issue has been put forth on the grounds of the so-
called  “circularity”  problem.  For  instance,  Mohanty  (2006)  defines 
circularity as taking place when 
 
while valuing a company using the Discounted Cash Flow approach, we need to 
know the cost of capital to value the company, and we need to know the value 
of the company (in particular the market debt-to-equity ratio) to find the cost 
of capital.  
 
The referred author proposed a solution of the problem, by means of an 
iterative algorithm that ultimately finds out the actual value of equity to 
be  used  in  the  cost  of  capital  assessment.  Following  another  track  of 
research,  Velez-Pareja  and  Tham  (2001)  support  a  solution  based  on 
market value corrections, period after period. 
 
Finally, a deeper analysis on the limitations of WACC paradigm and the 
convenience of shifting towards an institutional-behavioral paradigm has 
been advocated by Dempsey (1996). 
 
Starting out from the mainstream discussion, this paper intends to make 
two contributions: 
 
a) To  frame  the  notion  of  cost  of  capital  within  the  context  of  a 
multiplicative model of returns, instead of the usual one which is only 
a linear approximation of the latter. 
 
b) To adjust the cost of capital for governance risk. 
 
So as to accomplish our goals, in section 1 we provide an overview of 
the conventional wisdom of cost of capital. It will be stressed that the 
current procedure to assess cost of capital lies on a linear approximation 
only. 
 
In  section  2,  the  unconventional  wisdom  is  unfolded,  showing  the 
linkage between the linear approximation and a multiplicative model for 
expected returns. 
 
It is for section 3 to introduce governance risk, stemming from a former 
contribution of ours that sets up a new governance index and a rate of   6 
governance risk (Apreda, 2007a). Last of all, section 3.1 maps out an 
adjustment to the cost of capital for governance risk.  
 
  
1. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT COST OF CAPITAL 
 
Let us assume that we start our analysis with certain firm endowed by 
the following capital structure: 
 
￿  Debt  (simple  bonds  or  bank  loans):  the  company  has  different 
kinds of debt that can be deployed in vectorial notation as follows: 
 
[ [ [ [ D ] ] ] ]   =  [ [ [ [ D 1 ; D 2  ; D 3 ;  ……….  ; D N  ] ] ] ] 
 
such  that  the  monetary  value  of  debt  is  a  weighted  average  of  debt 
components: 
 
D   =   x 1 . D 1  +  x 2 . D 2  +  x 3 . D 3  +  ……….  +  x N . D N   
 
provided that   
 
x 1  +  x 2   +  x 3   + …………   +  x N   =  1 
 
where 
x g  =  D g   /  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ D h     ;   h : 1, 2, 3, ……. , N 
 
￿  Stock (ordinary shares): the company might have issued shares in 
different dates; perhaps with distinctive voting features in each case. 
 
[ [ [ [ S ] ] ] ]   =  [ [ [ [ S 1 ; S 2  ; S 3 ;  ……….  ; S M  ] ] ] ] 
 
such that the monetary value from the portfolio of equity varieties is a 
weighted average of its components: 
 
S   =    y 1 . S 1  + y 2 . S 2  +  y 3 . S 3  +  ……….  +  y M . S M   
 
provided that   
 
y 1  +  y 2   +  y 3   + …………   +  y M   =  1 
 
where 
y i  =  S i   /  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ S j     ;   j : 1, 2, 3, ……. , M 
   7 
￿  Financial  Hybrids  (mainly  preferred  stock,  convertible 
preferred stock, bonds with warrants, and convertible bonds) 
 
[ [ [ [ FH ] ] ] ]   =  [ [ [ [ FH 1 ; FH 2  ; FH 3 ;  ……….  ; FH O  ] ] ] ] 
 
such that the monetary value from the portfolio of financial hybrids is a 
weighted average of its components: 
 
FH   =    z 1 . FH 1  + z 2 . FH 2  +  z 3 . FH 3  +  …….  +  z O . FH O   
 
provided that   
 
z 1  +  z 2   +   z 3   + …………   +  z O   =  1 
 
where  
z k  =  FH k   /  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ D l     ;   l : 1, 2, 3, ……. , O 
 
The conventional wisdom states that the rate k, the cost of capital for 
such  company,  can  be  worked  out  as  a  weighted  average  of  the 
expected return of each component in the capital structure
4: 
 
k   =    x D R D  +  y S R S   +   z FH R FH 
 
such that     
x D  +  y S   +  z FH   =  1 
where  
 
xD = D/(D+S+FH); yS  = S/(D+S+FH);  zFH = FH/(D+S+FH);    
 
As  for  the  expected  returns  from  the  three  main  components  of  the 
capital structure, we have to assess them the following way: 
 
 R D   =   x 1 . R(D 1)  +  x 2 . R(D 2)  + …….  +  x N . R(D N)   
 
R S   =   y 1 . R(S 1)  +  y 2 . R(S 2)  + …….  +  y M . R(S M)   
 
R FH   =   z 1 . R(FH 1)  +  z 2 . R(FH 2)  + …….  +  z O . R(FH O)   
 
It is from the firm’s valuation side that the expected rate of return from 
debt, R D, stands for the after-tax cost of debt. In point of fact,  
 
                                                 
4 For valuation purposes, at date t, the rate k should be referred as the “expected cost of capital”, 
because the rates of return for stock, debt and financial hybrids are expected values. It is only for 
ease of notation we do not use as from now the expected value operator E[ [ [ [ . ] ] ] ].    8 
R D  =  ( 1 – tax rate )  .  r D 
  
where rD denotes the nominal average rate of return from the portfolio 
D. Such expression derives from the next one: 
 
R D   =   ( 1 – tax rate )  .  r D 
 
=   x 1 . ( 1 – tax rate ) . r(D 1)  +  x 2 . ( 1 – tax rate ) . r(D 2)  +  
 
…….  +  x N . ( 1 – tax rate ) . r(D N)   
 
A similar procedure would hold if the firm has some financial hybrid that 
qualifies for a tax shield, as it is the case with convertible bonds. 
 
1.1  THE PORTFOLIO APPROACH TO COST OF CAPITAL 
 
Since  Markowitz’s  innovative  method  for  managing  portfolios
5,  there 
have  been  distinctive  developments  far  beyond  the  founding  issue. 
Therefore, organizations were regarded as dual portfolios (the first one 
given  by  their  assets,  the  second  consisting  in  their  liabilities  and 
equity). On this line of research, value enhancement meant that the rate 
of  return  from  the  former  should  be  higher  than  the return  from  the 
latter portfolio. 
 
Another constructive framework of analysis was employed by Modigliani 
and  Miller  through  a  series of  consequential  papers,  most  remarkably 
the one published in 1958
6. On their own viewpoint, the company has a 
portfolio that consists of its own securities  
 
P   =    Company’s Portfolio of Securities   
 
defined as the following vector of proportions:  
 
P  =  { { { { xD ; yS ; z FH  } } } } 
 
such that  x D  +  y S   +  z FH   =  1 
  
Applying the well-known expression for the expected return from any 
portfolio, in Markowitz’s sense: 
 
R ( P )  =  x D R D  +  y S R S   +   z FH R FH 
 
                                                 
5 Markowitz (1952, 1959) 
6 See the References section.   9 
For  all  intents  and  purposes,  the  rationale  behind  the  conventional 
wisdom would lie on the following identity: 
 
R ( P )   =   k 
 
 
2. THE UNCONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT COST OF CAPITAL 
 
We now settle down to another perspective that consists in factoring the 




1 + K  =  < 1 + x D R D > . < 1 + y S R S > . < 1 + z FH R FH > 
 
The  right  side  of  this  equation  can  be  broken  up  into  the  following 
components: 
 
1 + K  =   1 + x D R D  +  y S R S   +  z FH R FH   + 
 
+  x D y S R D R S   +  x D z FH R D R FH  + 
 
+  y S z SFH R S R FH    +  x D y S z FH R D R S  R FH 
 
or, equivalently,  
 
K  =    x D R D  +  y S R S   +  z FH R FH   + 
 
+  x D y S R D R S   +  x D z FH R D R FH  + 
 




K  =    k   +   x D y S R D R S   +  x D z FH R D R FH  + 
 
+  y S z SFH R S R FH    +  x D y S z FH R D R S  R FH 
 
Hence,  the  cost  of  capital  stemming  from  the  multiplicative  model 
contains  a  linear  approximation  that  amounts  to  the  cost  of  capital 
according  to  the  conventional  wisdom.  However,  a  non-linear 
component is also embedded in the multiplicative model and the bridge 
                                                 
7  More  background  and  foundations  in  Apreda  (2006)  who  introduced,  for  the  first  time, 
multiplicative models in the context of residual information sets, differential rates, and transactional 
algebras.   10
between  both  the  linear  and  non-linear  components  may  become 
significant and non-rejectable eventually, measured by the expression: 
 
K – k   =    x D y S R D R S   +  x D z FH R D R FH  + 
 
+  y S z SFH R S R FH    +  x D y S z FH R D R S  R FH 
 
By far, this sort of approach lends a coherence and unity to our subject 
matter that the linear perspective lacks eventually. 
 
2.1  THE LINKAGE BETWEEN K AND k (THE METRICS OF 
SUBSTITUTION) 
 
We wonder to what extent it is advisable for the analyst to substitute 
the linear approximation of cost of capital 
  
k =   x D R D  +  y S R S   +  z FH R FH 
 
for the multiplicative interpretation of cost of capital  
 
K  =    k   +   x D y S R D R S   +  x D z FH R D R FH  + 
 
+  y S z SFH R S R FH    +  x D y S z FH R D R S  R FH 
 
The  rationale  behind  the  substitution  of  K  for  k  in  the  context  of 
applications,  should  be  tracked  down  into  whether  next  condition  is 
fulfilled or not, eventually:  
 
½ ½ ½ ½ K – k ½ ½ ½ ½  <  10 
- a a a a 
 
For the sake of illustration, we now move on to Table 1, where we deal 
with a company which offers, at valuation date, 8 % of return from debt 
(net of tax) and 11% on the standing stock
8. We figure out K and k 
under  five  different  sets  of  weights  for  debt  and  stock.  It  can  be 
witnessed that the gap 
 
½ ½ ½ ½ K – k ½ ½ ½ ½ 
 
is relevant. In all cases the discrepancy keeps over 10 
– 3, which does 
not make reliable the linear approximation. 
 
 
                                                 
8 These rates are current values for many developing countries. In fact, rates are usually much 
higher.    11
 
 
















K  -  k 
0.30  0.70  0.08  0.11  0.1028  0.1010  0.0018 
0.40  0.60  0.08  0.11  0.1001  0.0980  0.0021 
0.50  0.50  0.08  0.11  0.0972  0.0950  0.0022 
0.60  0.40  0.08  0.11  0.0941  0.0920  0.0021 
0.70  0.30  0.08  0.11  0.0908  0.0890  0.0018 
 
 
3. GOVERNANCE RISK 
 
In  a  recently  published  paper  (Apreda,  2007a),  I  introduced  a  new 
weighted  average  governance  index  out  of  which  a  measure  of 
governance risk can be derived
9.   
 
The  governance  index,  at  date  t  and  for  certain  company  “c”,  arises 
from the expression 
10 
 
G(c; t)  = 
 
=  w(1). G(c, 1, t) + w(2). G(c, 2, t)  + …… + w(Q). G(c, Q, t) 
 
It is for the rate of change worked out from this index to gauge good or 
bad governance performance, throughout the horizon [ [ [ [t; T] ] ] ]: 
 
1 + r c (governance)   =    G(c; T)  / G(c; t) 
 
Taking advantage of the rate of change of this governance index, we set 
forth a measure of governance risk, by solving: 
 
< 1 + r c (governance) > . < 1 – D D D D govrisk >  =  1 
 
to get at last,  
                                                 
9 Gompers et al. (2001) provided with a qualitative index intended to measure the compliance with a 
set of provisions in the foundational charters of listed companies in the United States. Our index 
goes beyond those provisions and takes into account a set of governance variables not necessarily 
contained in the charters. Besides, it applies also to closed companies, not listed, as it seems the 
rule in developing countries.  
10 Further details about the index components can be found in the Appendix at the end of this 
paper.   12
D D D D govrisk   = r c (governance) / < 1 + r c (governance) > 
 
Whenever the company improves its governance, from date t to date T, 
it holds that   
r c (governance) > 0 
 
whereas if governance performance lessens, the rate becomes negative. 
By the same token, good governance makes  
 
D D D D govrisk >  0 
 
and the final outcome is a decrease of the adjustment for governance 
risk measured up by 
 
< 1 –  D D D D govrisk > 
 
whereas bad governance leads to the opposite outcome:  
 
D D D D govrisk <  0   
 
and, therefore,     
 1 - - - - D D D D govrisk   >  1 
 
 
3.1  COST OF CAPITAL ADJUSTED FOR GOVERNANCE RISK 
 
The  adjustment  for  governance  risk  has  two  alternative  courses  of 
action: either we embed it into the linear approximation or we deal with 




In  keeping  with  the  linear  expression  for  the  cost  of  capital,  the 
approximation would be given by
11 
  




In contrast with the former approach, the framing of governance risk 
into the multiplicative model proceeds from 
 
                                                 
11 When adjusting for governance risk we denote cost of capital as K + gov and k + gov.   13
1 + K + gov  =  < 1 + x D R D > . < 1 + y S R S > .  
 
. < 1 + z FH R FH > . < 1 - - - - D D D D govrisk > 
 
Bear in mind that if  
 
D D D D govrisk < 0 
 
then K + gov  becomes larger since governance worsens, adding up to the 
overall risk premium in cost of capital. 
  
Again, the suitability of both models follows from the gap between K and 
k. 
 
In Table 2, we profit from Table 1 by substituting K + gov  and k + gov for K 
and k. The gap 
 
½ ½ ½ ½ K + gov  - - - -  k + gov  ½ ½ ½ ½ 
 
is less than 10 

















D D D D govrisk 
 
 
K + gov 
 
k + gov 
 
K + gov  -  
k + gov 
0.30  0.70  0.08  0.11  0.01  0.0918  0.0910  0.0008 
0.40  0.60  0.08  0.11  0.01  0.0891  0.0880  0.0011 
0.50  0.50  0.08  0.11  0.01  0.0862  0.0850  0.0012 
0.60  0.40  0.08  0.11  0.01  0.0832  0.0820  0.0012 






Summing  up,  this  paper  raises  the  issue  of  to  what  extent  the 
conventional usage conveys reliable information or distorts the value we 
expect from any fair assessment of cost of capital.  
 
To  avoid  a  faulty  linear  approximation  to  the  cost  of  capital,  the 
multiplicative  model  turns  out  to  be  more  functional  and  also  wide-
ranging to the needs of the analyst.   14
Finally,  governance  risk  is  a  subject  matter  that  should  not  go  on 
unnoticed any longer. We have brought forth its inclusion both in the 
conventional approach as well the multiplicative framework so as to get 
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APPENDIX   
 
The subsequent vector comprises a chosen list of explanatory variables 
for governance, at date t, 
  
G   =   [ G(1), G(2), … … … … , G(Q) ] 
 
A weighting system, at date t, will arise out of the vector 
 
W  =  [ w(1), w(2), w(3), … … … … , w(Q) ] 
 
The index should  be defined, at date  t out of a  universe of available 
companies, also framed as a vector 
 
G  =  [  c1 ; c2 ; c3 ;  …… ; c V ] 
 
and to compute its value at date t, for certain company c belonging to G G G G, 
we avail ourselves of the scalar product of vectors G and W: 
 
G(c; t) =  
 
= [G(c; 1; t), G(c; 2; t), … , G(c; Q; t)] . [w(1), w(2), … , w(Q)] 
 
that is to say, the index springs up from the dated expression: 
 
G(c; t)  =   
 





G(c; t)  =   ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  w(i) . G(c; i; t)      ;   i: 1, 2, 3, … … , Q 
 




G(c; i; t)    = G(c; i; t – 1)  +  e e e e(c; i; t – 1; t) 
 
                                                 
12 When writing down G(c; t), we mean the value of the index at date t for company c, whereas 
G(c; j; t) stands for the value of the governance variable G(j) at date t, for company c. 
13 We assume that the variable “date at t” belongs to a denumerable set that stands for an index 
set. More background on recursive or inductive definitions can be found in Bloch (2000).   17
(App.1) provides the dynamical setting from which the index evolves as 
time passes by.  
 
It’s worth noticing the inner structure of the second term on the right 
side of the expression above: 
 
 
      + 1  (compliance
14 level)  
if there is material evidence that the underlying 
variable  has  moved  for  the  better  over  the 
valuation period. 
 
e e e e(c; j; t – 1; t) =     0       (neutral level) 
if  there  is  no  conclusive  evidence  that  any 
material change has taken place.  
 
      - - - - 1  (non compliance level) 
if there is material evidence that the underlying 
variable  has  moved  for  the  worse  over  the 
valuation period. 
 
Summing up, (App.1) defines each governance variable inductively. In 
other words, (App.1) conveys the idea of an accumulative process that 
holds  for  every  company  c.  As  time  goes  by,  the  process  rewards 
compliance and punishes non-compliance, period after period.  
 
At this juncture, we have to render account of our choice of governance 
variables. They are sorted out in Exhibit 1
15 under the headings of six 
broad  categories,  namely  Board  of  Directors,  Owners,  Governance 
Architecture, Management, Creditors, Gatekeepers and Regulators.  
 
It  goes  without  saying  that,  in  actual  practice,  the  analyst  or 
econometrician laboring over this index may shorten the list of variables 






                                                 
14 Compliance risk and compliance functions are newcomers in the governance parlance, since 
their introduction by the Bank of Basel like guidelines for financial institutions worldwide. The first 
extension of both notions to non-financial organizations was provided by Apreda (2007b). 
15 Further background on the semantics of the variables included in Exhibit 1 can be found in 
Apreda (2007c, 2005, 2003)   18
 
 
EXHIBIT 1                   Governance Variables 
 
 
Board of Directors 
 
Independent Directors 
CEO and Chair as separate functions 
Control and fiduciary duties 
Audit Committee 
Staggering appointments 
Compliance risk committee 





Control and decision rights 
Tight-budget constraints 
Rent-seeking avoidance mechanisms 
Compensation packages  
Severance payments 
Anti-takeover provisions 





One share, one vote 
Differential voting rights 
Pyramids and cross-holdings structures 







Protective covenants in bonds and bank’s 
loans 
Financial hybrids and capital structure 
Banks’ influence on Boards 







Codes of Good Practices 
Reorganization provisions 
Design of accountability mechanisms 
Transparency procedures 
Private or public placements of securities 
 
Gatekeepers and regulators 
 
Federal or state incorporation rules 
Design of open or closed organizations 
Auditor independence 
Credit risk ratings 
Compliance risk 
Corporate or Private Companies Laws 
 
 
Starting  from  a  universe  of  V  available  companies,  conveyed  by  the 
vector  
G G G G=  [ [ [ [  c1 ; c2 ; c3 ;  …… c V ] ] ] ] 
 
and taking into account the vector of Q governance variables  
 
G   =   [ G(1), G(2), … … … … , G(Q) ] 
 
we can define a sample space matching our purposes as the cartesian 
product 
   19
G ´ ´ ´ ´ G G G G   = { { { {  ( G(i) ; c j )  ½ ½ ½ ½ i : 1, 2, … , Q  ;  j : 1, 2, … , V  } } } } 
 
Afterwards,  we  define  a  boolean-valuation  function,  Bool,  from  the 
cartesian G ´ ´ ´ ´ G G G G on the set  
 
{ { { {  (a i 
j ) Q ´ ´ ´ ´ V   ½ ½ ½ ½ i : 1, 2, … , Q  ;  j : 1, 2, … , V } } } } 
 
of all real matrix of L files by S columns, in the following way: 
 
Bool  :    G ´ ´ ´ ´ G G G G     ® ® ® ®     (a i 
j ) Q ´ ´ ´ ´ V 
such that 
 
Bool [ ( G(i) ; c j ) ]     =  ( d d d d i 




1  if company j is responsive to  
variable i 
a i 
j   =  
 d d d d i 
j   =   
   
0  if company j is non-responsive to 
variable i 
 
Hence, from the sample space stems a matrix of coefficients, whose files 




        d 1
1   d 1
2    d 1




1   d 2
2    d 2




1   d 3
2    d 3
3    ….…… d 3 
V 
( d d d d i  
j  ) Q  ´ ´ ´ ´ V = 
      ……………    …………. 
      …………..    …………. 
 
d Q
1   d Q
2   d Q




Being responsive for the company c j to the variable i, means at least 
three things: 
 
                                                 
16 Such a matrix is boolean, and its coefficientes become Kronecker’s deltas. 
   20
a) the  variable  becomes  related  to  the  company’s  governance  in  a 
distinctive way; 
 
b) we can ascertain whether the company is performing well or badly, 
regarding that variable; 
 
c)  if the company c j is unrelated to certain variable i, then there is no 
responsiveness and d d d d i 
j  is zero. 
 
We are going to take advantage of this matrix to set up the weighting 
system, by means of the cardinal number for the following finite set
17: 
 
# # # # { { { {File ( h ) } } } }  =   # # # # { { { {  d d d d h  
j  = 1  ;   j: 1, 2, … , V } } } }  
 
that is to say, we count the number of non-zero elements in such file.  
 
Lastly,  we  compute  each  weight,  for  any  governance  variable  h,  by 
solving 
  
w(i)   =  # # # # { { { { File ( i ) } } } }  /  ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ # # # # { { { { File ( h )  ;  h: 1, 2,  …  , Q } } } } 
 
 
                                                 
17  For  ease  of  notation,  we  follow  the  widely  used  symbol  # # # #  { { { {A} } } },  that  stands  for  “the  cardinal 
number of the set A”, where A is a finite set. Bloch (2000) enlarges upon this subject matter by 
means of a basic and readable framework of analysis.   